The aim of this research is the efficient cryptanalysis of the Shrinking Generator through its characterization by means of Linear Hybrid Cellular Automata. This paper describes a new known-plaintext attack based on the computation of the characteristic polynomials of sub-automata and on the generation of the Galois field associated to one of the Linear Feedback Shift Registers components of the generator. The proposed algorithm allows predicting with absolute certainty, many unseen bits of the keystream sequence, thanks to the knowledge of both registers lengths, the characteristic polynomial of one of the registers, and the interception of a variable number of keystream bits.
Introduction
Stream ciphers play a fundamental role in secure communications due to their different practical advantages such as easy implementation, high speed and good reliability. Such ciphers may be generally defined as simple bitwise additions between the plaintext stream and the running keystream. Nonlinear combinations of Linear Feedback Shift Registers (LFSRs) are the most frequently used running key generators because if they are properly designed, keystream sequences easily exhibit some ideal characteristics such as long period and balanced statistics. However, in general it is much more difficult to guarantee their unpredictability.
From a cryptanalysis point of view, stream ciphers must be resistant against known-plaintext attacks. In these attacks, it is assumed that cryptanalysts may intercept some bits of the keystream, and their goal is to get some information about the seed of the keystream generator or about the unseen keystream bits, faster than exhaustive search of all possible keys.
The Shrinking Generator (SG) is a nonlinear combinator based on two LFSRs so that the bits of one output are used to determine whether the corresponding bits of the second output are used as part of the overall keystream [1] . SGs are simple and scalable generators that produce pseudorandom sequences with good security properties. There have been several approaches for attacking the SG. A basic divide-and-conquer attack requiring an exhaustive search through all the possible initial states and feedback polynomials of the selector LFSR was proposed in [2] . The authors of [3] described a correlation attack targeting the second LFSR. A correlation attack based on searching specific subsequences of the output sequence was introduced in [4] . More recently, a distinguishing attack applicable when the second LFSR has a low-weight feedback polynomial was investigated in [5] . However, despite all these attacks, the SG continues being considered resistant against efficient cryptanalysis.
On the other hand, Cellular Automata (CA) are discrete mathematical models in which a lattice of finite state machines, called cells, updates itself synchronously according to local rules [6] . Because of their simplicity, regularity, modularity and cascadable structure with local neighbourhood, CA are ideally suited for VLSI implementation. CA have been proposed both for secret and public key cryptography [6] , [7] , [8] . Also cryptanalysis of certain CA based keystream generators have been published [9] , [10] . A recent work that explores the use of CA as models for predicting pseudorandom binary sequences is [11] , where a Cellular Automata-Based model for the Shrinking Generator was proposed. Such a work may be considered the starting point of this research.
This work has been laid out as follows. The two next sections give relevant background about the basic structures we are dealing with: Linear Hybrid Cellular Automata and Shrinking Generators. The Cellular Automata-Based model for the Shrinking Generator that is used in this work is described next. Section 5 gives the theoretical basis of the proposed CA-based cryptanalysis of the SG. Sections 6 and 7 introduce the full description of the algorithm and its analysis, respectively. Finally, in Sect. 8 several conclusions and open questions are drawn.
Linear Hybrid Cellular Automata
Cellular automata are finite state machines that consist of arrays of n cells. Each one of these cells can be in two or more states. According to local rules, the cells are updated synchronously in discrete time steps. The state of a particular cell at the next time step is determined by the current states The simplest nontrivial CA are binary and onedimensional, with two possible states per cell and a cell's neighbours defined as the cell on either side of it. These automata were called elementary cellular automata by Wolfram, who studied extensively their properties [6] . A cell and its two neighbours make out a neighbourhood of 3 cells, so there are 2 3 = 8 possible patterns, and 2 8 = 256 possible rules. These 256 CAs are generally referred to using a standard naming convention invented by Wolfram [6] . The name of a CA is a decimal number which, in binary, gives the rule According to rule 90, the value of a particular cell i is the sum modulo 2 of the values of its two neighbour cells on the previous time step t. Rule 150 also includes the value of cell i at time step t. So, these rules may be alternatively defined as: The matrix algebraic tool employing minimal and characteristic polynomials of the characteristic matrix showed various interesting features of CA behaviour. The first important finding was the categorization of linear CA into group and non-group CA. In a group CA each of the states has a single predecessor which is not true for non-group CA. The most effective application of null group CA has been proposed in the field of pseudorandom pattern generation, since the authors of [12] showed that maximum length CA-group CA with all non-zero states lying in a single cycle-produce high quality pseudorandom patterns. It has been established that the maximum length cycle can be produced only if the characteristic polynomial is primitive as well as only if rule 90 and/or rule 150 is used to construct the CA [13] . On the other hand, the authors of [14] examined the concatenating maximum length CA to obtain longer or smaller ones maintaining that property.
In this research only one-dimensional 90/150 null LHCA are considered. Binary string R 1 R 2 . . . R n are here used to represent n-cell LHCA, where R i is either 0, if cell i uses rule 90, or 1, if cell i uses rule 150, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Given an irreducible polynomial, several algorithms have been developed to find its corresponding LHCA [12] , [13] , [15] . The most recent one, proposed in [13] , applies the Euclidean algorithm to compute the LHCA in a polynomial running time, so it is sufficiently fast to generate LHCA for polynomials of very large degree.
On the other hand, in [16] , a synthesis algorithm based also on the Euclidean algorithm which allows to calculate in linear time the characteristic polynomial for any given LHCA was introduced. In this work such an algorithm will be called Polynomial-Synthesis Algorithm.
It is instructive to work out the numbers of different ncell LHCA and polynomials of degree n. In general, we have 2 n different polynomials since each of the coefficients can be 0 or 1. For n-cell LHCA, we have 2 n different choices because each of the n cells can be selected in two ways: either rule 90 or rule 150. It is well-known that there is a 2-to-1 correspondence between LHCA and irreducible characteristic polynomials since each irreducible polynomial is characteristic polynomial of two different LHCA, [13] . Consequently, reducible polynomials exist which are not characteristic polynomial of any LHCA.
The Shrinking Generator
The shrinking generator was introduced by Coppersmith, Krawczyk, and Mansour [1] . The SG is a well-known keystream generator composed of two LFSRs: a selector register that produces a sequence used to decimate the sequence generated by the other register.
The selector register is here denoted by S , its length is L S , its characteristic polynomial is P S (x) and the sequence it produces is {s i }. The decimated sequence is denoted {a i }, the second register that produces it is A, its length is L A and its characteristic polynomial is P A (x). So, the shrunken sequence {z j } may be defined according to the following rule:
The period of the shrunken sequence is (2
. Despite its simplicity, the SG has remained remarkably resistant to cryptanalysis because there are no known attacks that are feasible if both LFSRs are too long for exhaustive search.
The Cellular Automata-Based Model for the Shrinking Generator
In this work we consider the linear model of the SG described in [11] in terms of LHCA. The equivalent LHCA obtained for any SG through the algorithm described there and here denoted CA-Synthesis Algorithm, are formed by concatenations of basic primitive LHCA and their mirror images, with one or two modifications (complementations of rules) in each LHCA component. In particular, we have found that the numbers of modifications in the described model are two in all but two concatenated LHCA, and only one modification in the two extreme LHCA. The output of the CA-Synthesis Algorithm are two equivalent LHCA for any SG with selector LFSR of length L S and decimated LFSR sequence produced by A. The characteristic polynomial of the equivalent LHCA is the same as the one of the original SG, that is to say, P(x) N . Since the equivalent LHCA are only related to the LFSR A and the length L S of the LFSR S , and the modifications consist exclusively in reconfiguring a rule 90 cell to a rule 150 cell or vice versa, the described CA-model of the SG provides a great economy in hardware by allowing the use of the same basic machine for many different SGs.
Since the number of concatenations is between 2
and 2 L S −1 , and the length of the basic primitive LHCA is L A , we have that the length of the equivalent LHCA is given
Consequently, in order to generate the whole shrunken sequence in one of the extreme cells of the equivalent LHCA it would be necessary to determinate uniquely the initial state of the equivalent LHCA which is able to produce it, and to get this, it would be necessary to intercept L shrunken bits. So, although we have a linear model of the SG, in order to break the SG with it, we need as many intercepted bits as the linear complexity of the SG.
This work provides an efficient way to use the CAmodel of the SG in order to guess unseen bits of the shrunken sequence correctly from the interception of a number of bits lower than the linear complexity of the SG.
Theoretical Basis
. . be the output sequence of the SG whose characteristic polynomial
. . denotes the t-th phase shift of Z. Finally, let α ∈ GF(2 L A ) be a root of P(x).
Chained Sub-Triangles
The equivalent LHCA may generate the shrunken sequence in any of its cells. Consequently, given a shrunken sequence z 0 , z 1 , z 2 , . . . , z r , it is always possible to assume, without loss of generality, that its generation is at the left extreme cell so that x
According to this, assuming the knowledge of r bits of the shrunken sequence, it is always possible to reconstruct r sub-sequences x t i of length r − i + 1 corresponding to the rules R i with 1 < i ≤ r so that
Since rules 90 and 150 are additive and the equivalent LHCA is null boundary, for any rule R i , the previous expression corresponds to a sum of some elements of the shrunken sequence:
whose sub-indexes correspond to the exponents of the unknown in the characteristic polynomial of the LHCA
Consequently
In this way, if the hypothesis
is fulfilled, then a d-th phase shift of the shrunken sequence reappears at cell i of the equivalent LHCA each second chained sub-triangle generated as explained in the previous paragraph. Furthermore, it is easy to see that if hypothesis (1) is satisfied, then each 2 j-th chained triangle provides r − 2 ji + 2 j bits of a jd-th phase shift of the shrunken sequence.
On the other hand, note that hypothesis (1) may be easily generalized to the following hypothesis:
so that if hypothesis (2) is satisfied, it is guaranteed the reappearance of a d-th phase shift of the shrunken sequence at cell i in each 2 l -th chained sub-triangle.
Finite Field
It is well-known that if {s n } is a sequence produced by a LFSR whose characteristic polynomial is irreducible, and α is a root of such a polynomial, then each element s n of the sequence may be written as the trace of the n-power of α [17] . Since P(x) is a L A -degree primitive polynomial, the successive powers α i , 0 ≤ i < 2 L A − 1 generate the finite field GF(2 L A ), and their respective traces equal the corresponding elements s i of the PN-sequence associated to the polynomial P(x). On the other hand, since the trace function is linear and all the powers of α may be expressed in terms of the first L A − 1 powers, the association between powers of α and elements of the PN-sequence may be transferred to linear relations between different phase shifts of the PNsequence and the first L A − 1 phase shifts.
From [11] we know that the shrunken sequence is composed of interpolations of different phase shifts of the PNsequence associated to the polynomial P(x), so that the element s i of the basic PN-sequence corresponds to the shrunken bit z iN . Consequently, any linear relation between different phase shifts of the PN-sequence deduced as explained in the previous paragraph corresponds to a linear relation between different phase shifts of the shrunken sequence, which are the same phase shifts obtained for the PN-sequence, but multiplied by N.
Cryptanalysis of the Shrinking Generator
Starting from the theoretical basis of the previous section, in the following we describe an efficient algorithm based on the generation of the finite field GF(2 L A ), which allows to test the hypothesis (2) obtained in linear time with the Polynomial-Synthesis Algorithm. The proposed cryptanalysis algorithm requires as input r intercepted shrunken bits of a sequence produced by a SG whose structure must be known, and provides as output a variable number of unseen shrunken bits.
Algorithm Off-line Phase:
Input: The lengths L S and L A , and the characteristic polynomial of A, P A (x) corresponding to the LFSRs S and A components of the SG.
Step 1: Using the CA-Synthesis Algorithm described in [11] , compute the two equivalent LHCA that are valid for any SG with selector LFSR of length L S and decimated LFSR sequence produced by A.
Step 2: Using the primitive L A -degree polynomial P(x) associated to the basic LHCA, generate the finite field GF(2 L A ) formed with the exponentiation of one root of such a polynomial, α, and express each element of GF(2 L A ), α e as a L A -length array E = [e 0 , e 1 , . . . , e L A −2 , e L A −1 ] where e i = i iff α i is present in the expression of α e .
Step 3: Using the Polynomial-Synthesis Algorithm described in [16] , calculate the 2 * r characteristic polynomials for all possible sub-LHCA considering from left rule to each rule of both LHCA obtained in the previous step, and express them as 2 * r different (L + 1)-length arrays
is an exponent of the unknown in the corresponding polynomial. Using the finite field generated in the previous step, decompose the array D as an equivalent linear expression a * B + C with a being a power of 2, and B and C two arrays such that
Consider B as the output of this step.
Step 4:
Step 3, search it within all the L A -length arrays obtained in Step 2, and if found it, associate to the corresponding rule the (N/a) * (a * e + c)-th phase shift for the N/a-th subtriangles.
Output: For each equivalent LHCA, favourable rules and corresponding phase shifts and sub-triangles.
On-line Phase:
Input: Output of the off-line phase and r intercepted shrunken bits.
Step 5: Once intercepted r shrunken bits, proceed with them by generating the chained sub-triangles indicated in Step 4 , to obtain for all successful rules u, ar 2 /2NR u bits of the (N/a) * (a * e + c)-th phase shifts of the shrinking sequence. Output: A variable number of bits of the shrunken sequence.
Note that all the computations made for any LHCA are useful for any other LHCA with the same basic CA and more concatenations, that is to say, the outputs of steps 2, 3 and 4 obtained for an equivalent LHCA with characteristic polynomial (P(x)) N 1 continue being correct for any other equivalent LHCA with characteristic polynomial (P(x)) N 2 , with N 1 |N 2 . Consequently, the cryptanalysis of a SG with LFSRs S 1 and A 1 are useful for the cryptanalysis of any other SG with LFSRs S 2 and A 2 such that its corresponding characteristic polynomial is (P A (x))N 2 with N 1 |N 2 .
Example:
The two equivalent LHCA of length 20 are computed using the CA-Synthesis Algorithm:
LHCA 1 :10001100000000110001 and LHCA 2 : 00000000011000000000
Step 2: The finite field GF(2 5 ) associated to P(x) is computed. Here only the powers that have the term 1 in their expressions are showed. , which may be used with only one or two chained sub-triangles, because they require less intercepted bits. With these rules we may deduce a number of unseen shrunken bits from positions94,76,92,77,68,64 anḋ 93 mod(124), which depend on the number of intercepted bits.
For example, after the interception of r=11 shrunken bits: 00111010110, we proceed with them by generating the four chained sub-triangles corresponding to the LHCA 2 for Rule R 2 
Analysis of the Algorithm
In this section we present some simulation results and a comparison with previous attacks. In the following we show a summary of the outputs from the off-line phase of the attack using the first LHCA from the tables in [18] . The next table contains the rules that allow to get new bits from an earlier triangle than 2 L S −1 -th. As the lengths of the LFSRs increase, the proposed attack naturally needs a larger intercepted sequence. Concretely, the maximum number r of intercepted bits that are necessary to guess n new bits is given by R i * 2 L S −2 + n. Note that the automata with more favorable rules associated give more information for each intercepted bit. In order to compare the proposed attack with known related results, two important aspects of our algorithm should be highlighted. First, the off-line phase is to be executed before intercepting sequence, and consequently, its computational complexity should not be considered in the same way as on-line computations (after interception). The second point is the determinism of the proposed attack because the obtained bits are known with absolute certainty.
The off-line computational complexity of the proposed attack is O(L A 2 * 2 L S ) whilst its on-line complexity is O(L A * 2 L S −2 ). If we compare it with the one of known attacks on SG, we find that all of them are actually exponential in L S or in L A , so the complexity of approach proposed here is not worse than those. In particular, the complexity of the divideand-conquer attack proposed in [2] is exponential in L S . The probabilistic correlation attack described in [3] has a computational complexity of O(L A 2 * 2 L A ). Also the probabilistic correlation attack introduced in [4] is exponential in L A . Finally, the distinguishing attack investigated in [5] needs approximately 2 32 bits to distinguish the SG with a weight 4 polynomial of degree 10000. However, note that the distinguishing attack does not try to recover the sequence, and instead, its aim is to distinguish the keystream from a purely random sequence.
Conclusions and Open Problems
The main purpose of this paper has been to introduce a practical known-plaintext attack on the shrinking generator, which does not require too many intercepted bits in order to predict with absolute certainty approximately the same number of unseen shrunken bits.
Any shrinking generator leading to a successful offline phase of the algorithm which implies the deduction of many unseen shrunken bits, should be rejected for its cryptographic use. Therefore, the described algorithm is useful both for cryptanalysts and for cryptographers who use the shrinking generator.
The two main advantages of the proposed cryptanalysis are the determinism of bits prediction and the possible application of the obtained results to different shrinking generators.
One of the subjects that are being object of work in progress is the modelling of other keystream generators through concatenations of maximum length CA.
